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Firms in various markets such as health care, financial services, software, consumer goods etc. spend 
significant amount of money on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The literature suggests 
ns and this 
either increases their purchase intention 
products and services. 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its strategic benefits, the empirical findings regarding the impact of CSR 
n doing so we model two types of CSR (i.e., company 
ability relevant CSR (CSR-CA) and company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA)) and allow firms to 
choose which one to pursue if they decide to invest in CSR, and incorporate the indirect effect of CSR 
through expectancy disconfirmation 
literature. Our analysis reveals the conditions under which it is optimal to invest in CSR and of what 
type. Then, we extend our analysis by investigating how the incr
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1    Introduction  
Firms in various markets such as health care, financial services, software, consumer goods etc. spend 
significant amount of money on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Recently Financial 
Times has reported that the Fortune 500 companies have spent more than $15 billion on CSR, this 
spending has come in various forms such as donating free drugs (Johnson & Johnson), giving free 
software (Oracle), investing in educational programs in developing countries (Prudential) or creating a 
more productive work environment for various minority groups (Chicago Fed).  
purchase decisions and this may either increase their purchase intention or make them willing to pay 
 (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Creyer and Ross, 1997; 
Pen Schoen Berland, 2010). In a recent global survey conducted by Nielsen
1
, fifty percent of 29,000 
respondents across 58 countries were found to have an intention of  paying a higher price for the products 
and services developed by companies that invest in CSR. 
activities such as new product development and advertising. Naturally, firms are concerned about the 
financial impact of CSR. Unfortunately, notwithstanding its strategic benefits, the empirical findings 
Walsh, 
2003). Given this confusion in the empirical findings, Margolis et al. (2009) suggest that future research 
conditions under which firms should engage in CSR and how to do it effectively. 
In this paper we propose a much more nuanced explanation for when and why investing in CSR can 
to invest efficiently in CSR. First, there are mainly two types of CSR
2
: company ability relevant CSR 
(CSR-CA) and company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA). An example of CSR-CA would be Ben & 
m sustainability 
program which would eventually enhance 
Another example would be the introduction of Tide Coldwater brand by Procter and Gamble, an 
investment in green technology that helped P&G to offer a better quality product which can save 395 
pounds of carbon di-oxide per household per year
3
. On the other hand an example of CSR-NCA would be 
purchases its 
1
 http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2013/nielsen-50-percent-of-global-consumers-surveyed-willing-to-pay-
more-fo.html                              
2
 See Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) 
3
  Please see http://www.pg.com/en_US/downloads/sustainability/reports/PG_2014_Sustainability_Report.pdf 
product clearly this is a CSR strategy, which would not improve company ability per se
4
. Since 
products when they observe the firm invest in CSR, of either type. But, when a firm invests in CSR-CA, 
 (Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2001). On the other hand, CSR-NCA does not influence corporate ability. A  recent article 
by Rangan et al. (20
- while some firms use the CSR activities to focus on philanthropy; others utilize the CSR opportunity to 
improve their operational effectiveness.  
When a firm invests in CSR-CA, the investment improves the process of new product development 
to be of higher quality. In fact Green and Peloza 
most important antecedents that strongly affect the success or failure of a CSR investment. Due to this 
his 
effect is explained by the expectancy disconfirmation framework.  Expectancy disconfirmation model 
(Churchill and Surprenant, 1982; Oliver, 1980; Oliver and Swan, 1989) states that consumers have 
expectations about the performance of the product/service, compare and contrast the actual performance 
to their formed expectations, and then experience a positive or negative disconfirmation that in turn 
affects satisfaction and purchase intentions. More specifically, performance above the standard has been 
termed positive disconfirmation, while performance below is referred to as negative disconfirmation. The 
degree of incremental (dis)satisfaction is a direct function of positive (negative) disconfirmation. 
Therefore, unlike CSR-NCA, CSR-CA has two conflicting effects on consumer utility. While the direct 
effect (i.e., the extra utility from buying a product which is produced by a firm that invests in CSR) is 
positive, the indirect effect (due to expectancy disconfirmation) is negative. Hence, when a firm is 
deciding whether to invest in CSR, it should also consider what kind of CSR to pursue. 
   We construct an analytical model in which there are two identical firms, working on developing a new 
product. can be of high quality or low quality. Each 
firm receives an additional fixed budget to spend either on pure R&D to improve its product development 
and manufacturing capabilities or on a CSR activity. We will refer to the former investment as NCSR (in 
short for non-CSR type of investment). If a firm chooses to invest in CSR then it also has to choose 
whether to pursue CSR-CA or CSR-NCA.  
Once firms decide on their CSR strategies, new product development outcomes are resolved and firms 
launch their new products. Then, firms optimally set their prices. If a firm chooses to invest in CSR, 
 new product increases. Furthermore, if a firm chooses to invest in either 
4
Please see http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4679-corporate-social-responsibility.html.
CSR-CA or in NCSR then its product development and manufacturing capabilities improve and, given 
the uncertain nature of new product development, the probability of the new product being of high 
quality increases. The investment in NCSR is not observable to consumers, but the investment in CSR-
CA by the firm is because in real life the investments in CSR are highly advertised and publicly shared. 
Hence, when the firm invests in CSR-
product development and manufacturing capabilities and expect oduct to 
be higher. 
   We find that both firms prefer to invest in CSR-  (i.e., the 
extra utility consumers derive from buying a product from a company that invests in CSR) and only one 
firm prefers to pursue CSR and that is of NCA type if . If 
 on 
 evaluative context- disconfirmation. 
For high sensitivity, the firms are better off pursing asymmetric CSR strategies-i.e., one firm investing 
in CSR-CA, while the other firm investing in CSR-NCA. For low sensitivity, only one firm prefers to 
invest in CSR and that is of CA type. 
We conduct our analysis for two cases: the case in which firms sequentially choose their CSR strategies 
and the case in which firms simultaneously choose their CSR strategies. Our analysis shows that 
CSR strategies are robust to the timeline of the game. However, when firms sequentially set their CSR 
strategies
hich type of CSR) and 
hence it is advantageous to be a first mover in setting CSR strategy. Furthermore, 
higher when consumers are highly sensitive to evaluative context. When firms simultaneously set their 
CSR strategies, we find that the outcome is a 
dilemma. In equilibrium firms choose to invest in CSR-CA, but they would be better off if they could 
coordinate on investing in CSR-NCA.  
   Finally, we conduct two behavioral experiments which provide support for the existence of expectancy 
disconfirmation in the CSR-
company engages in company ability related CSR than when it engages in company ability irrelevant 
CSR. In line with the extant literature, these experiments make it clear that firms should not ignore the 
 
 
2    L iterature Review  
In recent years a number of papers have shown that CSR may lead to many commercial benefits for 
the business organizations. For example, CSR activities would have positive influence on brand/company 
evaluations, brand choice, brand recommendations, customer satisfaction and loyalty, customer-firm 
-harm crises situation (Brown and Dacin, 1997; 
Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Berens et al., 2005; K lein and Dawar, 2004). 
Some exist
example according to Mohr and Webb (2005) CSR activity would have a stronger effect than price on 
 
However, the empirical findings regarding relationship between CSR and financial performance are 
mixed. Some find positive relationship between CSR and firm financials (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Beurden 
and Gossling, 2008; Wu, 2006; Maron, 2006; de V elde et al., 2005; Gregory et al., 2014), some find 
negative relationship (Wright and Ferris, 1997; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Brammer et al., 2006), and 
some find no significant relationship (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Seifert et al., 2003, 2004; Moore, 
2001; Soana, 2011). As summarized in the review paper Margolis et al. (2009), across a total of 251 
papers there is a mildly positive relationship such that the median and weighted average effect size of 
CSR on firm financials is lower than the mean effect size. Thus, the mean is inflated by large effect sizes 
of a small number of studies that used relatively small sample of companies. It has been suggested that 
this conflicting outcome in the literature may be caused by: 1. focusing on different dimensions of CSR 
and 2. omitting important control variables. Regarding the former issue, there exist a substantial number 
of papers which differentiate between company ability relevant CSR and company ability irrelevant CSR. 
Bauman and Skitka (2012) suggest that some form of CSR can provide employees with sense of security, 
feelings of belongingness, self-esteem and a deeper sense of purpose at work, all of which would 
eventually make them more productive. Similarly, Shen and Benson (2014) claim that companies 
purposefully bring in skill-enhancing CSR elements, which enhance employee performance. Given the 
importance of CSR dimensions, these papers clearly justify further categorization of CSR activities (i.e. 
CSR-NCA vs. CSR-CA). Regarding the latter issue, McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Surroca et al. 
(2010) 
CSR and firm financials becomes insignificant. Similarly, Surroca et al. (2010) empirically show that 
when a firm invests in CSR, this may either improve (sometimes even destroy) its R&D capability, 
human resources, and brand value, which in turn affects positively (or negatively) its financials. 
There are few analytical papers that study when and why investing in CSR is profitable. Becchetti et 
strategy for the firms would be to compete on price and not on CSR investment. Baron (2001) finds that 
when competition is high (i.e., product differentiation is low) few firms would invest in CSR at the 
equilibrium. Similarly, Bagnoli and Watts (2003) find that when the degree of price competition is quite 
high, CSR would invariably reduce the profitability of the firms. In more recent studies, Garcia-Gallego 
 
of a socially responsible firm goes up. K rishna and Rajan (2009) show that without spillover effect firms 
will have both products on cause marketing unless the cost of cause marketing is too high. However, with 
spillover effect firms will have only one of their products on cause marketing and hence, avoid head-to-
head competition in cause marketing. By using a dynamic model, Wirl et al. (2013) investigate how firms 
should plan their CSR activities over time in a competitive setting and find that history dependence can 
occur (i.e., whether CSR is an optimal strategy in the long run depends on the initial level of CSR 
activities). Ghosh and Shankar (2013) provide a rationale for why it is profitable for firms to donate a 
part of their profits to a charitable cause. They analytically show that consumers may prefer to donate to a 
public good through their purchase of linked private goods rather than directly donating out of their 
income so that their donation becomes visible. V ery recently Iyer and Soberman (2015) investigate the 
D 
that makes their product more socially responsible. A  consumer derives a social comparison benefit when 
he interacts with another consumer who consumes less socially responsible product and incurs a social 
comparison cost when he interacts with someone who consumes more socially responsible product. 
Authors show that when economic value of the product is low (high), incentive to innovate in order to 
make the product more socially responsible decreases (increases) as social comparison effects increase. 
   In this paper, different from the extant analytical work, we develop an analytical model which 
incorporates the two types of CSR activities (company ability relevant CSR and company ability 
(i.e., expectancy disconfirmation), and 
mediating role of product development and manufacturing capabilities between CSR and profitability). 
As suggested by the literature (see Surroca et al., 2010) when a firm engages in a CSR activity that 
improves the working conditions, it in turn improves the 
product/process innovation capabilities as well. Furthermore, prior research has shown that one's level of 
expectations about a service or product is affected by brand connotations, symbolic elements and 
marketing communications (Oliver 1980; Oliver and Swan 1989). CSR activities a firm engages in are 
excellent ways to commu
and service expectations. Any deviation from the adaptation level or the reference point that the 
marketing communications set are thought to be caused by the degree of disconfirmation (i.e. the product 
or service may exceed, meet, or fall short of one's expectations leading to positive, zero, or negative 
disconfirmation). Satisfaction, product/service evaluations and purchase intentions can be seen as a 
combination of the expectation level and the resulting disconfirmation (Oliver, 1980). In a CSR context, 
we suggest that CSR-CA yields high consumer expectations about product performance; as such 
activities eventually contribute to company productivity. When such high expectations are paired with 
Oliver, 1980) and purchase intentions will be adversely 
impacted (Oliver, 1993), leading to negative disconfirmation. 
Therefore, we believe that our model, by incorporating the recent findings of the empirical literature on 
CSR, enables us to perform a more comprehensive analysis of when firms should invest in CSR and if so 
then which type of CSR they should pursue. 
In the following we will first present our aforementioned experiments and then we layout our model set 
up. 
 
3    E xperiment 
We designed two experiments to support a key assumption in our model regarding the existence of 
expectancy disconfirmation in CSR context. The main objective of our experiments was to test the 
impact of CSR-CA and CSR-
that consumers assess a new product developed by a firm that has invested in CSR-CA less favorably 
than a product developed by a company with CSR-NCA activities due to expectancy disconfirmation. 
Pretest 
A  pretest was conducted to validate our manipulation of CSR type. One hundred and forty-five 
MTurk participants from North America were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions. 
In the CSR-CA condition, the scen
electronic testing equipment. The company offers several consumer and industrial products. ZENET has 
recently initiated the Skill Enhancement Initiative for its women and minorities employees. This initiative 
provides training for the CURRENT employees in the use of the latest production and manufacturing 
technologies. This has made the female and minority employees more comfortable in their work 
environment. The turnover rate in this group has dropped to a meager 3%, as compared to industry 
 
In the CSR-
Corporation develops and manufactures electronic testing equipment. The company offers several 
consumer and industrial products. ZENET has recently undertaken the Feed the Children Initiative in 
Bangladesh in an effort to provide breakfast and lunch at schools in major cities. In the schools where the 
initiative has been implemented, attendance has improved by 50% (as compared to a mere 40% in 
 
(scenarios adapted from Brown and Dacin (1997)). 
Next, participants rated the following three statements about the expected company productivity as a 
result of CSR investments on a 7-  actions have direct 
ove the 
comp
 (  Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree). These measures were 
highly correlated ( ) and we combined them into a productivity index. Finally, we assessed our 
 
 (  Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree). 
As we expected, participants in the CSR-CA condition rated the productivity of the company to be 
significantly higher than those who were in the CSR-NCA condition, demonstrating that our 
manipulation works as intended 
. 
Moreover, participants anticipate a significantly higher quality product from a firm who invests in 
CSR-CA rather than CSR-NCA 
 
Study 1a 
One hundred and fifty-two MTurk participants from North America were randomly assigned to one of 
the scenarios tested in the above pretest (CSR-CA vs. CSR-NCA). Next, all participants read a 
description about QUANTEK  A25, a new prod
is a device that can measure and monitor basic vital statistics, including respiration, heart rate, blood 
Union, Co
noted some convenience with the unit as it combines several functions into one small unit. Next we asked 
our respondents to take a moment and imagine they are on the market to buy such a product and rate the 
extent to which they agree with the following three statements on a 7-
QUANTEK  25 is bad/good; negative/positive; unfavorable/favorabl
correlated . Therefore, we combined them into a new product evaluation index. 
Results reveal that participants in the CSR-CA condition evaluated the new product less favorably 
than participants in the CSR-NCA condition demonstrating the expected expectancy disconfirmation 
(negative disconfirmation) 
 
Study 1b 
In Study 1b, we used a different context to examine the role of expectancy disconfirmation. One 
hundred and twenty-six MTurk participants from North America were randomly assigned to one of the 
following scenarios (CSR-CA vs. CSR-NCA). In the CSR-
company is undertaking a corporate social responsibility (CSR) program. With this initiative, annual 
check-ups are fully covered for all the employees and their families. The company also works with 
several on-site experts (organizational psychologists) to design and constantly improve workplace 
environment to boost employee engagement . In the CSR-NCA condition, the scenario reads 
cosmetics company is undertaking a corporate social responsibility (CSR) program. With this initiative, 
the company has invested in protecting rainforests in Brazil. The firm developed projects and activities 
5
 
Next, all participants read the following description about a new product developed by the company. 
ight 
Cream. Studies demonstrate the power of topical antioxidants existent in this cream (particularly CoQ10 
and vitamins C and E) to significantly rejuvenate and protect skin. However, this new product has 
received only average ratings from consumer repor
and imagine they are on the market to buy such a product and evaluate it using the same procedure as in 
-point scale ( Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree). 
Results demonstrate that participants in the CSR-CA condition evaluated the new product less 
favorably than those in the CSR-NCA condition 
. 
-CA condition is significantly less 
than that in the CSR-NCA condition 
, once 
again showing the expectancy disconfirmation that CSR-CA induces. 
Discussion 
In line with the literature on the contextual influence on target product evaluations, we have documented 
expectancy disconfirmation as a result of a discrepancy between the judgment standard and actual 
performance (Herr et al., 1983; Herr, 1986; Lynch et al., 1991; Oliver, 1980). Our experiment shows 
that if a firm invests in CSR-CA, consumers believe that its productivity and manufacturing capabilities 
will improve; therefore a new product by the firm will be of a better quality than a product by a 
company with a CSR-NCA investment. When the new product is an average item, however, consumer 
The scenarios are created using the Dahlsrud (2008) framework and pre-tested to ensure company evaluations are 
the same across conditions. We randomly assigned eighty Mturk users to one of the two scenario conditions (CSR -
NCA vs. CSR-
(1-very negative/7-very positive). An independent samples t-test shows that there is not a significant difference in 
company evaluations across conditions (MCA = 4.95, SD= 1.55; MCA = 5.20 , SD= 1.71 ,t(78)=.68, p=.49).
evaluations are significantly less favorable when the product is by a firm that invests in CSR-CA. Note 
that expectancy disconfirmation occurs only after some deliberation that is needed to correct for the 
assimilatory power of the context (Herr, 1986; Meyers and Tybout, 1997). Exposure to extreme 
exemplars induces expectancy disconfirmation (in this case, negative disconfirmation as the product 
performance is lower than expected) since such exemplars alert participants and diminish the biasing 
influence of the context (Herr et al., 1983). When such high expectations triggered by the CSR context 
suggested by previous work (e.g., Oliver, 1993). 
 
4    Model Setup  
There are two identical firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) working on developing a new product. With 
probability  the quality of the new product will be equal to , where  and with probability  the 
quality of new product will be zero (i.e., the new product will not be good enough for consumers to 
consider buying). We normalize the manufacturing cost of the new product to zero. Consumers are in the 
market to buy at most one unit of product and their willingness to pay for quality is equal to one. If a 
consumer decides not to buy then the utility of his outside option is zero. 
Each firm receives an extra fixed budget (B) to spend either on pure R&D or to invest in CSR (either 
in company ability relevant CSR (CSR-CA) or in company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA)): 
 When a firm spends this extra budget for pure R&D, its product development and 
manufacturing capabilities improve and as a result,  new product 
quality being equal to  increases from  to 1. This strategy is called NCSR. 
 If a firm chooses to invest in CSR-CA then it improves its product development and 
manufacturing capabilities as well. As a result, 
being equal to  to .
6
 Furthermore, consumers derive extra utility from 
buying a new product that is developed by a firm engaging in CSR.
7
 
 If the firm pursues CSR-NCA strategy then its product development and manufacturing 
capabilities do not change. But, consumers derive extra utility from buying a new product that 
is developed by a firm engaging in CSR. 
Note that  comes from . We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this simplification.
7
 When a firm engages in NCSR or CSR-CA, the increase in its product development and manufacturing 
may also allow the re
investigate how this additional effect of NCSR and CSR-CA strategies impacts our results and discuss the results of 
the robustness check in Section 5.3. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
-CA, 
CSR-NCA, and NCSR). We build our utility function based on the findings of the experimental work in 
the consumer behavior literature and CSR literature, which establish both direct and indirect effects of 
The direct effect is positive, i.e., consumers become willing 
to pay a higher price for the product due to CSR activity being performed by the firm. On the other hand, 
CS expectancy 
. In their work on the effect of CSR on company and product evaluation, Brown and 
Dacin (1997) demonstrate that when consumers evaluate a product in the context of low perceived 
company ability (i.e., consumers expect lower quality products from the firm), the product evaluation 
tends to be high compared to a situation when the company is perceived to have high ability (i.e., 
consumers expect higher quality products from the firm). This means that if a company pursues product 
irrelevant-
to develop and manufacture new product and hence, only induce positive direct effect on the product 
evaluations (i.e., this type of CSR activities will not induce expectancy disconfirmation 
product evaluations). However, if the company invests in CSR activities that will also increase its ability 
to develop and manufacture new product then the indirect effect will be negative. Sen and Bhattacharya 
 
among the consumers who highly support the CSR domain and think that 
highly relevant to the product evaluations. The authors experimentally show that as the evaluation of the 
company becomes more favorable and consumers expect more f , as a result 
of its CSR activities, the purchase intentions of these consumers for even a high quality new product may 
decrease. In the light of these experimental works and also our own experimental results we model 
ility function such that it has two components. 
First component is the absolute utility consumers derive from the product. If firm i, where i={1,2} , 
invests in CSR then the absolute utility  is 
equal to: 
                                                              ,                                                                           (1) 
where is the price of the new product from firm i, where i={1,2}  and  
utility from buying a product from a firm investing in CSR. In a way  
become willing to pay a higher price  
If firm i does not invest in CSR then the absolute utility consumers derive from buying its new product 
is equal to .  
The second component is the relative utility with respect to expectation of the new 
product quality. This is equal to , where  is 
sensitivity to the evaluative context  
   
before the actual product is developed and launched. Note that as 
quality decreases consumers evaluate the actual new product  more favorably. 
After the new product is launched when consumers are making their purchase decision, there is no 
uncertainty regarding the quality of the new product; consumers become aware of the actual quality of 
the new product and will not consider buying the new product if the actual quality is zero. Therefore, in 
our model  represents the expectancy 
disconfirmation. 
less utility from the new product and hence their evaluation of new product will be lower.
8
  
As a result, consumer utility from buying a new product with actual quality of  is equal to 
 
 
                                                                                           (2) 
Therefore, if firm i pursues CSR-CA then before the actual product is developed and launched 
consumers think that with probability  the quality of the new product will be equal to  and with 
probability  the quality of the new product will be equal to zero. Therefore, pre-  
expectation of new product quality is equal to . As a result, after the new product is launched when 
making purchasing decision,  utility from firm i  will be 
equal to 
                                                                                                                    (3) 
On the other hand, if firm i pursues CSR-NCA strategy then before the actual product is developed 
and launched consumers think that with probability  the quality of the new product will be equal to  
and with probability  the quality of the new product will be equal to zero. Therefore, pre-launch 
 expectation of new product quality is equal to . As a result, after the new product is 
In our model at the time of purchase there is no uncertainty regarding the quality of the new product. Hence, if a 
firm were allowed to engage in advertising that promotes its abilities this would only -
launch expectation of new product quality, which in turn would decrease its profitability. However, in cases that 
consumers cannot be sure about the quality of the new product without using it, advertising 
profits. 
 
launched when making purchasing decision, firm i
quality  will be equal to 
                                                                                                                    (4) 
When firm i does not pursue CSR and invests its money in NCSR , this does not become as public 
as investing in CSR, which is specifically done to improve the public opinion about the company and 
promoted by the company.
9
 Firms constantly invest in improving their product development and 
manufacturing capabilities, by hiring more employees or finding more efficient ways to manufacture their 
products, and unless the act of investing in these capabilities is public by its nature, such as merging with 
or acquiring another company, consumers do not become aware of the investment. In fact, even a merger 
or an acquisition may not attract attention of an ordinary consumer, as a CSR action would do, unless it is 
done with a high profile company. This means that compani  (i.e., our R&D 
investments) is much less observable than their CSR type of investments. Therefore, in our model we 
simply assume that NCSR investment is not observable to the consumers and if consumers do not 
observe the firm investing in any type of CSR, they do not update their expectation of new product 
quality. This means that when firm i pursues NCSR, pre-launch  expectation of new product 
quality is equal to . As a result, when firm i pursues NCSR, after the new product is launched when 
making purchasing decision,  will be 
equal to 
                                                                                                                            (5) 
  
s expected profit,  denote the probability of the quality of firm i
equal to ,  , 
  at zero price ( ), 
and   at zero 
price ( ). Then, 
 
                                                                     (6) 
9
For example, every year Lee jeans celebrates Lee national denim day on first Friday of October and invites 
companies to have their employees wear jeans to work one day and donate for breast cancer fund. Procter & 
-care line partnered with American society for Dermatologic surgery, and it was widely 
covered in tv, print and online media. Coca-
emotional narrative from one of the 80 men of the Benares Deaf and Dumb Institute who have been given 
employment as bottle inspectors at Coca-  
We know that  if firm i pursues NCSR,  if firm i invests in CSR-CA, and  
if firm i invests in CSR-NCA. The first part of profit function (6) is when both firms develop the new 
 (this happens with probability ). When both firms successfully 
, firm i receives positive profits only if consumers receive higher 
-i.e., if . In this case, the 
price of firm i ( ) is equal to . The second part of the profit function (6) is when firm i is the 
 (this happens with probability 
). T
zero and hence, consumers will not even consider buying it. In that case, firm i becomes a monopolist 
and its price ( ) is equal to . 
We would like to note that since we normalize the manufacturing cost to zero, in profit expression (6) 
there is no manufacturing cost parameter. 
Therefore, in our model after deciding whether to invest in CSR and if so of what kind, firm i chooses the 
optimal price  that maximizes its expected profit function . Similarly, the rival firm j also chooses its 
optimal price  that maximizes its expected profit function 
10
  
   Finally, one may wonder what happens if a firm does not want to spend the extra budget B. Recall that 
in our model firms started working on developing the new product before they receive the extra budget. 
Thus, if a firm does not spend the extra budget B it receives, either on NCSR or on CSR, then the 
stay as  .  We assume that B is less than the 
minimum expected gain from spending B for any of the three strategies (NCSR, CSR-CA, and CSR-
decision would be trivial and our analysis will not be meaningful. 
Next, we will proceed with the analysis of our model. We first investigate the case in which only Firm 1 
invests in CSR. Then, we analyze the case in which both firms can invest in CSR. Y ou may find all the 
proofs in the Appendix. 
4.1    Benchmark Case: F irm 2 cannot invest in CSR   
In this section we analyze the benchmark case in which Firm 2 cannot respond to Firm 1 by investing in 
CSR-
pay for its product through its CSR strategy. Later, in Section 5 we extend our analysis to the case in 
which Firm 2 can invest in CSR as well. In this case, Firm 1 (i.e., the first mover) can use CSR 
This means that in our model prices are not exogenous; firms set their own prices. 
R 
investment decision. By investigating these in stages, we will able to disentangle how the demand-side 
CSR and if so, what type of CSR. 
The game proceeds as follows. At  Firm 1 decides whether to do CSR and if so what kind of 
CSR. At  
prices. Finally, at  consumers make their purchasing decision and the game ends.  
 
Proposition 1 F irm 1 chooses to pursue CSR-CA if  and CSR-NCA otherwise. 
According to Proposition 1, if the utility from a product manufactured by a firm 
investing in CSR is high enough  
Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-CA and otherwise, Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-NCA. The intuition 
for this outcome is as follows. First, note that if Firm 1 pursues NCSR it receives zero profits. Remember 
that the rival is also doing NCSR, hence both firms will develop and manufacture the new product with 
 with probability one and the new product will be identical. As a result, Firm 1 will have no 
competitive advantage when it launches the new product. Thus, Firm 1 never prefers to pursue NCSR. 
When Firm 1 invests in CSR rather than NCSR, it will be able to enjoy the gain from CSR  when it 
develops the new product with quality .  If Firm 1 chooses to invest in CSR-CA then with a higher 
 (i.e., probability of    rather than probability of 
). This means that with higher probability Firm 1 will be able to enjoy the gain from CSR  when it 
pursues CSR-CA. On the other hand, if Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA it benefits more from the expectancy 
disconfirmation. 
to  when Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and equal to  when Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA. This means that 
if Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA rather than CSR-C  from expectancy disconfirmation will 
be higher by . Thus, F irm 1 needs to make a tradeoff between increasing the probability of enjoying 
the gains from investin
increasing the gain from expectancy disconfirmation. As a result, Firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-CA if 
the gain from CSR relative to the gain from expectancy disconfirmation is high enough (i.e.,  
and prefers to invest in CSR-NCA otherwise. 
 
5    Both firms can invest in CSR   
Recall that in Section 4.1, we have investigated the case in which the firm (i.e., Firm 1) can strategically 
use CSR to increase the  utility from its new product and assumed that the rival (i.e., Firm 2) 
cannot respond by investing in CSR. In this section, we relax this assumption and modify our timeline as 
follows. At  Firm 1 decides whether to invest in CSR and if so what kind of CSR. At  Firm 2 
decides whether to invest in CSR and if so what kind of CSR. At  
outcomes are realized and they simultaneously set their prices. Finally, at  consumers make their 
purchasing decision.  
One may question the sequential move of firms investing in CSR. In the sequential game, the firm (i.e., 
s incentive to invest in CSR. Thus, the sequential 
structure helps us identify whether there is any first mover advantage in CSR. Many managers believe 
that CSR helps the corporations to be seen as industry leaders
11
, and some even argue that with a 
sustainable CSR strategy the first movers can achieve higher market share
12
 or take control of their 
profits
13
. In a recent article on CSR, Forbes magazine has vouched for such gains from CSR investment, 
ays and is now core to successful strategy, the 
14
 
Later in Section 5.1 we will solve for the case in which firms simultaneously decide whether to pursue 
CSR and what type of CSR as well. By doing this we will 
decisions being simultaneous or sequential changes their equilibrium CSR strategies. 
   optimal CSR strategies in the sequential game. 
 
Proposition 2 There exist ,  and  such that  
 For : 
F irm 1 invests in CSR-CA and F irm 2 invests in CSR-CA if   
F irm 1 invests in CSR-CA and F irm 2 invests in CSR-NCA if   
F irm 1 invests in NCSR and F irm 2 invests in CSR-NCA if   
 For :  
F irm 1 invests in CSR-CA and F irm 2 invests in CSR-CA if   
F irm 1 invests in NCSR and F irm 2 invests in CSR-CA if    
F irm 1 invests in NCSR and F irm 2 invests in CSR-NCA if   
 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2011/04/26/the-five-elements-of-the-best-csr-programs/#1621cfa833fd 
12
 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120491426245620011 
13
 http://business.time.com/2012/05/28/why-companies-can-no-longer-afford-to-ignore-their-social-responsibilities/ 
14
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2011/05/16/why-csr-is-countercyclical/#ba99df130d13 
The expressions for cut off points ( , , ) are given in the Appendix. First, we observe from 
Proposition 2 that unlike when only Firm 1 can invest in CSR, when both firms are capable of investing 
in CSR, the first mover (i.e., Firm 1) never prefers to invest in CSR-NCA. This means that the 
competitive considerations  
When both firms can invest in CSR, Firm 1 prefers to pursue either CSR-CA or NCSR depending on 
firms engaging in 
Firm 1 prefers to pursue CSR-CA i , hence the extra utility consumers 
receive from a new product produced by a firm investing in CSR, is high 
pursue NCSR if  is low. However, if ation of CSR is in medium range 
optimal strategy changes from CSR-CA  sensitivity to evaluative context is low 
(i.e., ). How is this possible? 
extra utility from a product that is produced by a firm investing in CSR is high, both 
firms would like to engage in CSR-CA because by doing so firms will be able to charge higher prices and 
will also increase their ability to develop the new product 
of CSR is low, for Firm 1 it does not make sense to invest in CSR; by pursuing NCSR Firm 1 makes sure 
that it will develop the new product  and also gains from expectancy disconfirmation by 
 For low  values, when Firm 1 
engages in NCSR, Firm 2 is better off pursuing CSR-NCA. If Firm 2 pursues NCSR then it will receive 
zero profits because the two firms will be undifferentiated . 
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA it loses pre-
launch expectation of the quality of its new product. As a result, Firm 2 is better off investing in CSR-
NCA.  
if Firm 1 invests in CSR-
 is low then 
Firm 2 prefers to engage i  
Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA then its competitive advantage over Firm 1 will be low. Thus, Firm 2 is 
better off pursuing NCSR and increasing the probability of developing the new product  
from  to 1. In that case, dium range  from 
CSR will not be high. However, since consumers are not much sensitive to evaluative context if Firm 1 
pursues NCSR then Firm 2 prefers to invest in CSR-CA so as to increase its chances to develop the new 
product  from  to  and low  values, 
Firm 1 is better off changing its strategy from CSR-CA to NCSR so that it can increase its chances to
develop the new product  to one. 
Firm 1 never prefers to invest in CSR-NCA. Why is that so? If Firm 1 invests in CSR-NCA, regardless of 
) being high or low, Firm 2 prefers to pursue CSR-CA if 
) and NCSR otherwise. For  Firm 1 will be 
better off investing in CSR-CA so to increase its chances to develop the new product to  
and be able to charge higher prices when it is the only firm to develop the new product. Note that for 
 if Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA then Firm 2 never prefers to pursue NCSR because Firm 2 would 
also like to enjoy the gain from engaging in CSR (i.e., through . Since Firm 2 does not prefer to pursue 
 gives a chance to 
Firm 1 to be the only firm to develop the new product . On the other hand, for  
 Firm 1 will be 
better off engaging in NCSR so to make sure that it will develop the new product  and also 
gain from expectancy disconfirmation. 
In the appendix using numerical values, we show the plots of equilibrium regions. Please see Figure (a) 
and Figure (b) in the Appendix. 
Observation: Based on the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 2, t s are higher 
th  unless 
strategy with its own CSR decision to its favor. However, if 
enough (i.e., ) then both firms prefer to invest in CSR-CA and hence their expected 
profits are the same. As a result, for such high  values, being a first mover in CSR strategy will not 
provide any advantage to the firm. 
differ depending on whether consumers are highly sensitive to evaluative c
 when  
 
Proposition 3 F irm 1 when consumers are highly sensitive to evaluative context 
evaluative context  
  
From Proposition 2 we observe that ) 
and when its low ( , regardless of how sensitive consumers are to evaluative context (the 
magnitude of -CA when 
 and Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA when . 
Therefore,  
However, for medium values of , depending on  For 
, if  then Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 engages in CSR-
strategies are the same if , where . However, Fir
; this time Firm 2 prefers to invest in CSR-CA. In this case, since the probability of the 
quality of Firm 2  new product being equal to is higher Firm 1 becomes worse off , if  
then both firms invest in CSR- , , where 
; this time Firm 2 prefers to invest in 
CSR-NCA. In this case, the probability of the quality of Firm 2  new product being equal to decreases 
and as a result, Firm 1 becomes better off. 
   
to the evaluative context through its marketing activities. The Italian luxury car manufacturer Maserati 
for example had created an advertisement where a representative customer insisted ''my car has to be 
fast, smooth, and give me a sense of control''. This ad
15
 was created to enhance consumers' sensitivity to 
the evaluative context by introducing new benchmarks for the product evaluation. In another example, 
Anheuser-Busch was the first beer brewer to use 'freshest before' with a date to advise consumers when 
the beer was brewed. Budweiser lists a "Freshest Before" date, which is approximately 110 days after the 
beer is brewed.
16
 By highlighting a new attribute in a product category, Budweiser increased consumers' 
sensitivity to the evaluative context. 
   Proposition 2, next we will investigate the impact of new 
product quality ( ) and consumer expectancy disconfirmation (  
 
Proposition 4 s increase in  and (i.e., F irm 2) 
profits increase in  and  unless  and    or : 
 If  and    s decrease in  and  
 If   independent of  and . 
 
This result is quite surprising. One would  and . Higher  
implies the better quality of 
utility from the new product and become willing to pay a higher price, which in turn would increase a 
When  is high, consumers are more sensitive to evaluative context. Since under any 
15
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvPvw6MQw48&amp= 
16
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rAODFE05ak
strategy (NCSR, CSR-CA, and CSR-NCA) pre-launch 
be equal to , firms always 
sensitivity to evaluative context increases. Then, how can  increase in  and ? 
Note that for  and    in equilibrium Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-
CA. In this case, c , while their 
to . This means that when a consumer buys 
, he gains 
new product. We also know that since Firm 1 pursues NCSR it will be able to develop the new product 
with qual  with probability one. Thus, when both firms develop the new product , Firm 
. Naturally, as  and  
competitive advantage will decrease, which in turn will reduce its profits. This result has two 
implications. First, facing a rival preferring not to invest in CSR, if the optimal strategy for the firm is to 
invest in CSR-CA (this happens if  and   ) then interestingly the firms is better off when 
the new product is more of an incremental type than when it is an innovative one. Second, the firm is also 
Avis 
for example created an ad campaign which highlighted the number two position of the firm in the car 
rental industry and promised that the firm would try harder
17
. In this case the firm tried to reduce 
consumers' sensitivity to evaluative context by posing as an industry follower. 
We also know from Proposition 2 that when , Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests 
in CSR-NCA. In this case, since 
equal to  rmation is same regardless of whether he buys 
ct. This means that when Firm 2 develops its new product 
, its competitive advantage over Firm 1 will be 
independent of  and . 
5.1    F irms Set their CSR  Strategies Simultaneously 
One may wonder what happens if the firms are symmetric in recognizing the CSR opportunities and in 
their ability to invest in CSR. Therefore, in this section we will allow firms to simultaneously set their 
CSR strategies. The new timeline of the game is as follows. At  both firm decides whether to invest 
17
 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/rivalries/2013/08/hertz_vs_avis_advertising_wars_how_an_ad_firm_made_a
_virtue_out_of_second.html  
in CSR and if so what kind of CSR. At  
they simultaneously set their prices. Finally, at  consumers make their purchasing decision.  
 
Proposition 5 When firms simultaneously set their CSR strategies, their optimal strategies are as 
follows: 
 For : 
Both firms invest in CSR-CA if   
One firm invests in CSR-CA and the other firm invests in CSR-NCA if   
One firm invests in NCSR and the other firm invests in CSR-NCA if   
 For :  
Both firms invest in CSR-CA if   
One firm invests in NCSR and the other firm invests in CSR-CA if    
One firm invests in NCSR and the other firm invests in CSR-NCA if   
 
strategies in Proposition 2 with the ones in Proposition 5, one can 
conclude whether firms set their CSR strategies sequentially or simultaneously does not make a 
difference for the equilibrium outcome. Therefore, we understand that firm  CSR strategies are robust to 
the timeline of the game. 
 
Observation: We know from Proposition 5 that if  
) then both firms invest in CSR-CA. However, unlike in sequential game, in this case 
firms are worse off; they would receive higher profits if both invest in CSR-NCA. Consequently, when 
both firms choosing CSR-CA strategy becomes a 
dilemma equilibrium. This result implies that when rival firms are aware that both of them will be 
investing in some kind of CSR activity around more or less the same time, for these firms coordinating 
their CSR strategies to be NCA type will be more profitable. One of the prominent examples in this 
regard involves FMCG behemoths Unilever and P&G. In 2012, Procter and Gamble launched a CSR 
campaign named 'Thank you mom' to celebrate mothers' roles in raising great kids. Unilever followed the 
suit by introducing their own CSR campaign named 'Project Sunshine' which appealed to the parents to 
make the world a better place for the kids.  
 
5.2    T estable implications of the model  
Our theoretical model has two parameters that affect the normative predictions. First, we have , the 
increase in  a product produced by a firm investing in CSR. The measure 
for this can be attained either by a direct survey like a conjoint study or by observing average prices 
before and after CSR activities have been initiated. A dummy variable for CSR activity can capture the 
impact of CSR on price beyond attributes like advertising, product quality, etc. Second, we have  which 
measures sensitivity to evaluative context. The sensitivity to expectancy disconfirmation will be greater 
in less turbulent industries (those which do not often see innovations). This is because  captures how 
sensitive consumers are to a product/production innovation surprise. In more turbulent industries, where 
innovations (both in product and production sides) are more frequent, the expectancy disconfirmation 
will be smaller. So  for consumer packaged goods will be more than that for tech industries. Hence it is 
fair to assume that , the measure of sensitivity to evaluative context, is specific to an industry. Thus, we 
suggest that one can measure  as the ratio of the number of innovations to the number of companies in 
an industry. The sensitivity to expectancy disconfirmation can however vary because of other factors,too. 
Anderson and Sullivan (1993) suggest that ease of evaluating quality and reputation of companies are 
two important factors in this regard. Johnson and Fornell (1991) argue that products with different 
maturity (i.e. products at the different stages of product life cycle) may induce differences in sensitivity to 
expectancy disconfirmation. 
 
Once the values of these two parameters are measured one can test the following hypotheses: 
1. Firms will be better off in investing in CSR-CA when  of CSR is high.  
2. When will be better off if only one firm is pursuing 
CSR and that is of NCA type. 
3. will be better off if they 
pursue asymmetric CSR strategies in industries with low ratio of the number of innovations to 
the number of companies. If that ratio is high then only one firm should pursue CSR-CA.  
 
We would like to note that the empirical analysis should be done by controlling for the cost of not 
investing in CSR. Specifically, in some industries/markets there might be legal requirements to invest in 
CSR or investing in CSR may be a general norm and hence it may not be feasible for a firm not to engage 
in CSR at all. India for example has recently passed a law, which requires companies to spend 2% of 
their net profit on activities related to CSR. Indonesia also has a law for companies carrying out activities 
in the natural resources sector to participate in environmental social responsibility program. In those 
cases, when testing the hypotheses 2 and 3 above, one should test whether investing more than the 
minimum required amount in CSR is better or not. 
 
 
5.3  Robustness Check -
as well  
 
When a firm invests in NCSR or CSR-CA, it improves its product development and manufacturing 
t and manufacturing 
capabilities enables the firm to develo
this issue we modified our basic model such that when a firm engages in NCSR or CSR-CA and develops 
the new product successfully, the realized quality of the new product is equal to , where . We find 
that as in Proposition 2, the first mover (i.e., Firm 1) never prefers to engage in CSR-NCA; instead it 
engages in CSR-  However, as investing in 
CSR-CA has become more advantageous the follower (i.e., Firm 2) naturally has a higher tendency to 
invest in CSR-CA than CSR-NCA. Specifically, for , CSR-NCA becomes dominated strategy. As 
a result, for  and for  pectancy 
disconfirmation is low) Firm 2 never prefers to invest in CSR-NCA.
18
  
 
6    Conclusion 
Our paper was motivated by the fact that firms in various markets spend significant amounts of money 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. However, it is not clear from the current literature if 
it is always profitable for the firm to invest in CSR activities. This paper therefore sets out to address 
this fundamental question. 
   Broadly, there are two main types of CSR activities, company ability relevant (CSR-CA) and company 
ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-  increases when 
they observe that the firm invests in CSR of either type. But when a firm invests in CSR-CA, it helps to 
improve the f
-NCA does not 
influence corporate ability. Unlike CSR-NCA, CSR-CA has two conflicti
utility. While the direct effect (i.e., the extra utility consumers receive from buying a product is produced 
by a firm that invests in CSR) is positive, indirect effect (i.e., expectancy disconfirmation) is negative due 
to the i pre-launch expectation.   
   Our analysis demonstrates that both firms should invest in CSR-  of CSR 
18
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to consider this possibility. Due to space constraint, the 
detailed proof of the result is available from the authors. 
is high. However, then only one firm should pursue CSR-NCA. 
If  would depend 
then the firms will be better off pursing asymmetric CSR strategies-i.e., one firm investing in CSR-CA, 
while the other firm investing in CSR-NCA. 
context is low, it will be better if only one firm invests in CSR-CA. l 
CSR strategies. 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
A  type. 
 
 
 
    
Our analysis also reveals that being a first mover in setting CSR strategy is advantageous and first 
advise the firms to beat their rivals in implementing CSR strategies and also to amplify the consumer 
sensitivity to evaluative context through their marketing communications. On the other hand, in cases 
that firms are planning to invest in CSR around the same time, we advise the firms to coordinate their 
 
 
We have looked at the positive utility that consumers derive from a firm's CSR activities. However, 
excessive levels of CSR activities can lead to a perception of "greenwashing", that is, firms are doing 
CSR activity to cover up vested corporate interests. It would be interesting to look at how these two 
opposing forces influence the extent of CSR activity in a competitive scenario.  In our current model 
firms make a onetime decision regarding their CSR activity. In a dynamic setting firms could be deciding 
repeatedly on the type of CSR activity. In such a setting, would it be better for firms to adopt same type 
of CSR activity that consumers have begun to associate it with or should they choose a different type of 
CSR activity to provide variety that may help catch consumer attention? The importance of CSR decision 
as a strategic tool can be better understood once future researchers address such questions analytically. 
The gain from CSR: very high 
 
 
The gain from CSR: medium 
 
 
 
The gain from CSR: low 
Both firms invests in CSR-CA 
 
Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA 
Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA 
 
Firm 1 invests in NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA 
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Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1: First, let  and  
 . Therefore, if Firm 1 also pursues NCSR then both firms will be able to develop the new product 
with quality  
 ). As a result, if 
Firm 1 pursues NCSR then  This means that Firm 1 will never prefer to pursue NCSR. 
If Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA, then Firm 1 will be able to develop the new product with quality  with 
probability . In this case, if 
 then  and . Otherwise,  and 
.  
If Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA then Firm 1 will be able to develop the new product with quality  with 
probability . In this case, 
 and .  
Thus, if  then Firm 1 will prefer to invest in CSR-NCA. In this case  and . 
For , if Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA then  and if Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA then 
.  As a result, if  then firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-CA and  and 
. If  then firm 1 prefers to invest in CSR-NCA and  and 
.   
Proof of Proposition 2: We know from the proof of P
-CA and CSR-NCA). We also 
 
Now, Firm 2 is allowed to invest in CSR-CA and CSR-NCA as well. If Firm 2 engages in CSR-CA then 
Firm 2 will be able to develop the new product with quality  with probability  
 is equal to . If Firm 2 engages in 
CSR-NCA then Firm 2 will be able to develop the new product with quality  with probability  and 
 is equal to .   
 
 
 Firm 1 pursues NCSR:  
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA:  and  if  and  
and otherwise.  
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA:  and .  
We know from the proof of P ll be 
equal to zero. Thus, for Firm 2, NCSR is dominated strategy.  
One can show that if  Firm 2 prefers to invest in CSR-CA and  and 
. Otherwise, Firm 2 prefers to invest in CSR-NCA and  and .  
Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA: 
If Firm 2 pursues NCSR:  and  if  and  and 
otherwise. 
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA: .  
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA:  and . 
One can show that Firm 2 prefers to pursue NCSR if . If   and  Firm 2 
pursues NCSR,  and  Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA, if  and  
Firm 2 pursues NCSR, if  and  Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA, and if 
 and  Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA.  
Firm 1 pursues CSR-NCA: 
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA: . and  . 
If Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA: .  
If Firm 2 pursues NCSR:  and .  
One can show that Firm 2 prefers to pursue NCSR if  and invests in CSR-CA otherwise. 
Before we proceed with solving the equilibrium outcome, we would like to show what happens when 
firm does not spend its extra budget B to invest in any of the three strategies. When Firm 1 pursues 
NCSR, if Firm 2 does not spend B then . When Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA, if Firm 2 does not 
spend B then  if  and  otherwise. When Firm 1 invests 
in CSR-NCA, if Firm 2 does not spend B then . When both firms do not spend their extra 
budget B, -CA, and CSR-
NCA, one can see that in any case Firm 2 would earn higher profits if it invests in one of the three 
strategies than if it does not spend B. Since firms are identical, this means that there exist small enough 
positive values of B for which both firms prefer to spend B.  
-CA, and CSR-NCA, next 
 
If   then Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA. 
For  
If    then Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA. 
If   then Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA. 
If   then both firms invest in CSR-CA. 
For  
If   then Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA. 
If   then Firm 1 pursues CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA. 
If   then both firms invest in CSR-CA. 
Let  , , and .   
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Figure b:
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Proof of Propositions 3 and 4: When  and , Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in 
CSR-NCA, and . When   and  , Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 
invests in CSR-NCA, and . One can see that .  
When  and , both firms invest in CSR-CA, and .  When   and  
, Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA, and .   
One can see that  .  
When both firms invest in CSR-CA, .   > 0 and   > 0.  
When Firm 1 invests in CSR-CA and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA,  and 
.  > 0,  > 0,  > 0 and  > 0. Note that  > .  
When Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-CA,  and .  
 > 0,  > 0,  < 0 and  < 0. Note that  > . 
When Firm 1 pursues NCSR and Firm 2 invests in CSR-NCA,  and .    > 0,  
 > 0,  = 0 and  = 0. Note that  > .  
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Proof of Proposition 5: We solve for the following game,
if  
Firm 1/Firm 2 ( , ) NCSR CSR-NCA CSR-CA 
NCSR (0,0) 
,   , 0 
CSR-NCA 
 
, 
  
, 
  
CSR-CA 
0,  , 
  
, 
  
 
if  
Firm 1/Firm 2 ( , ) NCSR CSR-NCA CSR-CA 
NCSR (0,0) 
,   ,  
CSR-NCA 
 
, 
  
, 
  
CSR-CA 
,  , 
  
, 
  
 
Equilibrium Outcome: 
For  
If    then (NCSR, CSR-NCA) and (CSR-NCA, NCSR). 
If   then (NCSR, CSR-CA) and (CSR-CA, NCSR). 
If  then (CSR-CA, CSR-CA). 
For  
If    then (NCSR, CSR-NCA) and (CSR-NCA, NCSR). 
If    then (CSR-NCA, CSR-CA) and (CSR-CA, CSR-NCA). 
If  then (CSR-CA, CSR-CA). 
When both firms invest in CSR-NCA,  and when both firms invest in CSR-
CA, . It is obvious that  
 I appreciation of CSR is high firms should invest in CSR-CA. 
 I low only one firm should pursue CSR (NCA).  
 For medium values, when sitivity to evaluative context is: 
 high, firms should pursue asymmetric CSR strategies. 
 low, only one firm should pursue CSR (CA).
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